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Abstract
The paper discusses the methodology and preliminary results of an investigation of 
the redistributive effects of social security contributions (SSC), personal income tax (PIT), 
public pensions as well as means-tested and non-means-tested cash benefits in Croatia. 
The transition from a pre- to a post-tax-and-benefit income is analyzed in order to reveal 
which instruments contribute most to the reduction of inequality. The Croatian system of 
individual taxes, pensions and social benefits seems to be highly redistributive, with pu-
blic pensions being the instrument that contributes most, followed by SSC and PIT.
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1 Introduction
The World Bank (2006) study confirmed previous findings (World Bank, 2001; Ne-
stić, 2005) that disposable income inequality in Croatia is mild in international compari-
sons and among the lowest within the transition countries of the region.1 Is this relatively 
low inequality of income distribution inherent to the Croatian economy and society, or is 
it a consequence of the fiscal activities of government? Given the experience of other co-
* I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and Marijana Bađun for copious advice, which helped me to 
make this paper more focused and readable.
** Received: March 27, 2008.
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1 The Gini coefficient amounted to 0.275 in 2004. This value was based on disposable income, including the 
value of production for own use and self-reported rental values for owner-occupied dwellings. Household incomes 
were equivalized using a “modified OECD scale”.388
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untries, and the fact that the share of government in GDP is high, a hypothesis can be set 
forward that government in Croatia has a significant influence on income distribution.
In Croatia, the distribution of fiscal burdens and benefits and its influence on income 
distribution have been only partially investigated. Kesner-Škreb et al (2001) and Urban 
(2006) have shown that the progressivity of PIT is relatively high and has been increa-
sing over the last decade. On the other hand, the study of Blažić and Denona (2000) ex-
posed the regressivity of the 1998 single-rate value added tax (VAT).2 According to Ne-
stić (2005) social transfers (excluding public pensions) slightly reduce disposable income 
inequality, while public pensions increase it significantly; a recent study by Babić (2008) 
presents similar results.3
However, there has been no attempt to provide a combined incidence calculation for 
several tax and benefit instruments. This paper presents such an investigation, which fo-
llows the approaches of Immervoll et al (2005), and Kim and Lambert (2007) to evaluate 
the redistributive effects of the fiscal subsystem consisting of SSC, PIT, public pensions, 
means-tested and non-means-tested cash benefits.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research framework, me-
asurement and data issues. Section 3 illustrates some of the most important preliminary 
results obtained for the year 2005. Special attention is devoted to estimates of the contri-
butions made by individual instruments to the overall redistributive effect, where the re-
sults diverge when different approaches are chosen. Section 4 resumes the main findings 
and poses questions for the next stage of research.
2 Methodology and data
2.1 Research framework
Government involvement in the market affairs results in varying net increases or de-
creases of living standards for different individuals. What is the distribution of these chan-
ges in the living standards among the population? Economists in the field of fiscal inci-
dence attempt to answer this question.
Instead of analyzing total fiscal system incidence, researchers often decide to concen-
trate on segments of it: single tax/benefit forms or groups of taxes and/or benefits. In the 
review of tax incidence research by Kesselman and Cheung (2004), such studies are cla-
ssified into the “inequality” (INEQ) group.4 Among INEQ studies are those that capture 
fiscal subsystems consisting of individual taxes and cash benefits. Despite certain con-
2 Simulations also indicated that zero rates on bread and milk products (introduced later in 1999) could not mit-
igate VAT regressivity.
3 Nestić (2005) estimated the contribution of pensions to disposable income inequality at plus 16.5% in 2002, 
while other social transfers contributed minus 2.1%. Babić (2008) estimated the contribution of pensions at plus 3% 
in 2003 (3.3% in 2005), and of other social transfers at plus 0.4% in 2003 (0.5% in 2005). See Section 3.5 for fur-
ther information.
4 The second group is made up of “Computable general equilibrium” (CGE) studies which examine the distribu-
tion of lifetime burdens of stylized taxes using complex mathematical economic models. “Fiscal incidence” (FINC) 
studies compute the pattern of progressivity or regressivity for each tax and the entire tax system using microsimu-
lation methods.389
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straints5, this framework is widely used, because it is closely connected with the traditi-
onal economic analysis of inequality and poverty. The transition from market income to 
disposable income is traced where the total redistributive effect is decomposed to show 
contributions of individual fiscal instruments.
2.2 Measures of living standard
The task of fiscal incidence research is to measure the difference between the living 
standard of different individuals in the pre-fiscal and post-fiscal situation, i.e. the situati-
ons before and after the government intervention takes place. In the INEQ type of rese-
arch, the term pre-fiscal relates to incomes before direct taxation and distribution of cash 
benefits, hence pre-tax-and-benefit (pre-TB) income. On the other side, the term post-
fiscal relates to incomes after direct taxation and cash benefits, hence post-tax-and-bene-
fit (post-TB) income.
Usually, pre-TB income includes market income together with the value of produc-
tion for own use and non-government transfers. Post-TB income relates to the disposable 
income of households, and is equal to pre-TB income minus direct taxes plus cash bene-
fits. However, the analyst may use alternative definitions of pre-TB income, taxes and 
benefits. For example, public pensions may not be treated as benefits, but rather as a sort 
of market income. Similarly, SSC to the pension system may be treated as a personal in-
vestment and not as a tax.6 
The definition of pre-TB income employed in this paper is presented by equations 
(1) to (4), with symbols explained in Table 1. It treats all three kinds of SSC as “taxes” 
and public pensions as “benefits”. Notice that public pensions are presented by no less 
than four variables. The first division is inspired by Immervoll et al. (2005), who intro-
duced separate treatment of two groups of pensioners: those aged less than 65, and those 
aged 65 years and more. The second division is between the pre-PIT and post-PIT pen-
sion income. The use of pre-PIT pensions (xpyo and xpol), when public pensions are not 
part of pre-TB income, creates an anomaly that would prevent the proper estimation of 
redistributive effect and reranking of this fiscal instrument.7 Therefore, npyo and npol 
will be used instead, and consequently the redistributive effect of PIT will be underesti-
mated, but only slightly.8
5 a) Inclusion only of direct taxes and benefits in analysis; exclusion of indirect taxes and in-kind government 
benefits, b) Assumption that income earners cannot shift the burden of personal taxes, c) Assumption that the existence 
of taxes and transfers does not affect market incomes, d) Annual instead of lifetime perspective.
6 In these cases, pensions would be included into pre-TB income, and excluded from the benefits. SSC for the 
pension fund would be excluded from pre-TB income and from the taxes.
7 For example, person A, whose only income is a pension of 100 m.u. (money units), pays 10 m.u. of PIT. Now, 
if we take pre-PIT pension as benefit variable (B) and PIT paid as tax variable (T), we have the following amounts for 
person A: pre-TB income=0, benefits=100, taxes=10. What happens in one-by-one instrument analysis? For PIT, we 
would obtain the curious result that person A was burdened by tax, despite having no pre-TB income. Thus, if benefits 
are taxable, the analyst should use amounts net of tax. Otherwise, the tax precedes its tax base in the transition from 
pre-TB to post-TB income. Another cure for this problem is to take post-TB income as the reference base instead of 
pre-TB income. That is exactly what Immervoll et al (2005) did, mentioning the issue explained above as one of the 
motives for such decision. Further details can be found in section 2.5.
8 According to Urban (2006), pension income contributed less than 2% of total PIT revenue in 2004.390
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The definition of incomes, taxes and benefits
X= xtmi + ntmi + nmng + sscp + ssch + sscu  (1)
T = sscp + ssch + sscu + pito  (2)
B = uneb + sicb + chla + bspa + mata + rehs + (npyo + npol)  (3)
N = X – T + B = (xtmi + ntmi + nmng + sscp + ssch + sscu) – (sscp + ssch
+ sscu + pitt) + (uneb + sicb + chla + bspa + mata + rehs + xpyo + xpol)
= xtmi – pito + ntmi + nmng + uneb + sicb + chla + bspa + mata + rehs
+ npyo + npol  (4)
2.3 Income redistribution: basic concepts and measurement
The capacity of a fiscal system to redistribute income is often comprehended as the 
change of income inequality in transition from pre-TB to post-TB income. The fiscal sy-
stem reduces (increases) income inequality when the relative net gains it creates are larger 
(smaller) for the income-poor than for the income-rich. This unequal treatment of unequals 
– the poor and the rich in income – is referred to as vertical inequity. Horizontal inequity, 
on the other side, relates to unequal treatment of equals.9 A further concept of reranking 
corresponds to the income scale rank-switching induced by fiscal system.10
With GX and GN as Gini coefficients of pre-TB and post-TB income, the redistribu-
tive effect is equal to RE = GX – GN.11 RE can be decomposed as RE = Vx – Rx, where Vx 
is vertical effect, a measure of vertical inequity, and Rx is reranking effect, a measure of 
reranking.12 It is calculated as Rx = GN – Dx
N, where Dx
N is the concentration coefficient of 
post-TB income, based on the concentration curve of post-TB income, Cx
N, for which the 
units are ordered by pre-TB income. Since Rx is always positive13, the decomposition for-
mula implies that more reranking means less redistributive power. The vertical effect is 
obtained as Vx = GX – Dx
N.14 
2.4   Decomposition of redistributive effect: contributions of individual fiscal elements
Researchers who use INEQ models capturing several fiscal instruments are faced with 
a natural question: How can the contributions of each of these instruments to the overall 
redistributive effect be determined?
Immervoll et al.(2005) “exclude” a particular tax or benefit from the income base and 
compare the inequality of the resulting variable with the inequality of the reference vari-
able. In their words: “Starting from a situation where this instrument does not exist, what 
are the distributive effects of it?” They proceed in the following manner. To the post-TB 
income they add amount of each tax instrument Ti (i = 1,…, p) separately, obtaining p va-
riables N + Ti. Next, from the post-TB income they subtract amount of each benefit instru-
9 This occurs when persons A and B have same pre-TB income, but different post-TB income.
10 For example, if C has a greater pre-TB income but a smaller post-TB income than D.
11 A thorough presentation of theory and measurement is given in Lambert (2001) and Duclos and Araar 
(2006).
12 In the indices Vx and Rx, the subscript x denotes the reference income, in this case pre-TB income.
13 As Cx
N cannot lie below Lorenz curve of post-TB income (LN), it follows that Rx ≥ 0. 
14 Subscript x in index Dx
N denotes the variable by which the income units are ordered when concentration curve 
Cx
N was constructed.391
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Table 1 Variables of income, taxes and benefits
Notation Description
General
X Pre-TB income
N Post-TB income
T Total individual taxes
B Total cash benefits
Market incomes
xtmi
Market income taxable by PIT: wages and salaries, self-employment income, income from 
part-time and contractual work, rental income and income from property rights
ntmi Non-taxable market income: dividends, interest
Non-market non-fiscal incomes
nmng Value of production for own use; Periodic transfers from private persons: gifts, alimonies
Public pensions
xpyo Public pensions to persons aged less than 65, before PIT
npyo
Public pensions to persons aged less than 65, after PIT 
(hence also „Pensions (<65)“)
xpol Public pensions to persons aged 65 and more, before PIT
npol
Public pensions to persons aged 65 and more, after PIT
(hence also „Pensions (65&>)“)
Taxes
sscp SSC to the pension system
ssch SSC to the health system
sscu SSC to the unemployment protection system
pitt Personal income tax and local surtax, total
pito Personal income tax and local surtax, on xtmi
pitp Personal income tax and local surtax, on xpyo and xpol
Benefits
bspa Basic support allowance (Socijalna pomoć)
uneb Unemployment benefit (Naknada za nezaposlenost)
chla Child allowance (Doplatak za djecu)
sicb Sick-leave benefit (Naknade za bolovanje duže od 42 dana)
mata
Maternity allowances (Primanja na ime porodnog dopusta; Primanja za opremu 
novorođenčadi)
rehs
Rehabilitation supplement (Naknade za tjelesno oštećenje i tuđu njegu; Iznos za rehabilitaciju 
i zapošljavanje invalidnih osoba)
a) The benefits other than public pensions are sorted into six groups. Basic support allowances provide subsistence to the 
income-poor. Rehabilitation supplement covers assistance to physically injured people and those who are taking care of them; 
also included is support for rehabilitation and employment of people with invalidity. Child allowance is received by families 
with children and income below a certain means-test level. Sick-leave benefit is paid to the people on sick leave for longer than 
42 days. Maternity allowances include maternity leave allowance and layette supplement. Unemployment benefit is received in 
the post-job-loss period; the amount does not depend on previous earnings. Social benefits are exempted from taxation.
b) All the benefits covered by this study are cash benefits. “In-kind benefits” or services produced by government (edu-
cation, health protection, etc), are not included, as is customary in INEQ studies.
c) In Croatia, SSC for pension fund is equal to 20% of gross wage and is paid by employees (maximum base is set at 
20% of 6 average gross wages; average obtained at the national level). SSCs for health and unemployment protection system 
are equal to 15.5% and 1.7% of gross wage, respectively, and are paid by employers. For the self-employed, SSCs are lump-
sum amounts. Pensions are not taxed by SSC. 
d) For employees, income taxable by PIT is defined as gross wage minus SSC for pension system. For the self-employed 
SSCs paid are treated as expenditures. Thus, SSCs do not enter the PIT base in Croatia.
e) This research uses the classical assumption that the whole burden of SSCs, irrespectively of their statutory inciden-
ce, is borne by employees. The same assumption relates to PIT.
f) Dividends were taxable by PIT only in the period from 2001 to 2004.
g) Observe the following relationships: (xpyo+xpol) – pitp = npyo+npol; pitp = pitt – pito; xpyo + xpol – pitt = npyo 
+ npol – pito
Source: Author392
I. Urban: Income Redistribution in Croatia: The Role of Individual Taxes and Social Transfers
Financial Theory and Practice 32 (3) 387-403 (2008)
ment Bj  (j=1,…, q) separately, obtaining q variables. Then they obtain Gini coefficients 
for N + Ti and N – Bj, namely   and  , and calculate the difference between these 
coefficients and the post-TB income Gini coefficient: GN+Ti – GN and GN–Bj – GN. These dif-
ferences can finally be ranked to indicate the most (the least) redistributive instruments.
Another way to evaluate contributions of individual fiscal instruments is to decom-
pose the vertical effect (Vx) in the manner proposed by Lambert (1985), the approach em-
pirically used by Kim and Lambert (2007). The original decomposition is adapted here to 
reflect the contributions of p individual taxes and q benefits:
 
(5)
where   and   are shares of tax i and benefit j in pre-TB income,   and
, whereas   and   are concentration coefficients of tax i and benefit j (based 
on concentration curves   and  , for which the income units are ordered by pre-TB 
income). The relative contributions of tax i and benefit j to overall vertical effect are re-
spectively obtained as   and
 
.
2.5 Reference income
What is the appropriate reference income in the measurement of income redistributi-
on? Pre-TB income is commonly used in research into tax progressivity. However, Ler-
man and Yitzhaki (1995) disagree, “think[ing] that the after-tax ranking is the appropriate 
ranking for calculating progressivity”. The “exclusion” method of Immervoll et al (2005) 
uses post-TB income as a reference income, while the “decomposition” method of Lam-
bert (1985) takes pre-TB income by default. 
However, we could consider an exercise in which opposite reference bases are 
used for two methods. In that case, the “exclusion” method would rank the differences
GX – GX-Ti and GX – GX+Bj (instead of GN+Ti – GN and GN-Bj – GN). For the “decomposition” 
method things are slightly more complicated. While the redistributive effect is still equal 
to RE = GX – GN, the vertical effect is now Vn = DN
X – GN, and the reranking is calcula-
ted as Rn = GX – Dn
X  (according to Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1995). Note that now we have
RE = Vn + Rn, where the reranking positively contributes to the redistributive effect. De-
composition of the vertical effect in (6) is analogous to equation (5):
 
(6)
where   and   are shares of tax i and benefit j in post-TB income,   and 
, whereas   and   are concentration coefficients of tax i and benefit j 393
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(based on concentration curves   and  , for which the income units are ordered by 
post-TB income). The relative contributions of tax i and benefit j to overall vertical effect 
are respectively obtained as   i  .
We are interested whether the contributions to redistribution significantly change 
when the reference bases are reversed. The results of the exercise are presented in secti-
on 3.4.
2.6 Data
The empirical research started with acquisition of microdata from the household bud-
get survey databases (Anketa o potrošnji kućanstava; APK) obtained from the Croatian 
Statistical Office (Državni zavod za statistiku; DZS), for the period 2001 to 2006. APK 
contains the relevant data on incomes (at individual level), consumption (at household 
level) and other indicators for a representative sample of households. However, the data 
on incomes are registered net of PIT and SSC. Therefore, the author developed a micro-
data-model that applies tax code to the data and transforms the net incomes into gross in-
comes, identifying the amounts of PIT and SSC for each individual.15 The data on social 
transfers are already available in APK.16
3 Results
3.1 Analysis by economic groups
For purpose of this descriptive analysis, benefits (other than pensions) are further gro-
uped into means-tested (child allowance and basic support allowance) and non-means-
tested (unemployment benefit, sick-leave benefit, maternity allowances and rehabilita-
tion supplement). Household incomes, taxes and benefits are equivalized using the fol-
lowing formula: 
Xi
e = Xi / ei (7)
ei = 0,5 + 0,5 × adultsi + 0,3 × childreni  (8)
where, for household i: Xi is income, Xi
e
 is equivalized income, and ei is the deflator with 
parameters defined as in the “modified OECD scale”.
15 This model uses all the data on individuals and their household members available in APK: working status, 
number of children and dependent spouses; place of living; net incomes by source (wages, pensions, self-employ-
ment income, capital income, rents, etc.); outlays on items such as mortgage interest rate, life insurance (needed for 
calculation of PIT deductions).
16 At that moment, the dataset used in this research was the best choice for given purpose. The usual caveats for 
survey and micro-simulated data apply. A superior choice would be the database compiled by merging datasets from 
various official sources (for example, population survey, tax administration, pension fund, relevant welfare state min-
istries and agencies, etc.). Such a database has been created for Slovenia (see Čok et al, 2008).394
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Households are divided into four groups depending on their members’ working sta-
tus and age. “Fully employed” households are those with one or more working-age adults 
(people aged between 15 and 64 years, excluding those involved in secondary or terti-
ary education henceforth WAAs) under the condition that all of them are employed or 
self-employed. In “mixed” households at least one WAA is employed or self-employed, 
and at least one WAA is either unemployed or inactive. In “workless” households, there 
are no employed or self-employed WAAs, while one or more WAAs are unemployed or 
inactive. “Elderly only” households do not include WAA members. Note that some of 
the elders (those aged above 64 years) live in the first three groups of households, toge-
ther with WAAs and children (those aged less than 15 and those involved in secondary 
or tertiary education).
Table 2 Defining groups of households
Type Characterization Equivalent units in 2005 (%)
Full employed em > 0, un = 0, el ≥ 0 33.5
Mixed em > 0, un > 0, el ≥ 0 32.5
Workless em = 0, un > 0, el ≥ 0 16.2
Elderly only em = 0, un = 0, el ≥ 0 17.8
Notes: em = employed or self-employed, un = unemployed or inactive; el = the elderly
Source: Author
Figures 1 shows the composition of income in 2005 for the economic status groups. 
Part of each column above the horizontal axis presents the average disposable income 
of the corresponding group, expressed as a percentage of the average disposable income 
of the “fully employed” group. The sum of (a) post-tax-pre-benefit income, (b) PIT and 
(c) SSC, is equal to pre-TB income. Large differences in average pre-TB income are vi-
sible across the groups, indicating a high level of pre-fiscal income inequality. Roughly, 
the ratio of pre-TB average group incomes is 13:8:2:1, respectively. However, due to go-
vernment taxes and transfers this ratio turns to the significantly milder ratio of 11:8:6:6, 
when we observe post-TB income. Both taxes and benefits help in the achievement of 
this result. Almost all taxes are paid by the first two groups. “Pensions (65&>)” can be 
found in all groups and naturally present the largest income component in the “elderly 
only” group. On the other hand, “Pensions (<65)” make almost half of disposable inco-
me of the “workless” group, largely outweighing non-pension benefits in overall impor-
tance for living standard.
3.2 Analysis by quintiles of pre-TB income distribution
Distribution analysis is repeated for households sorted into quintile groups, and the 
results are shown in Figure 2. The poorest 40% households hold 6.5% of total pre-TB in-
come, but end with one quarter of disposable income. They received 59% of all pensions 
and other benefits, and paid 3.4% of all taxes. The middle quintile group receives in bene-
fits just as much as it contributes through taxes, which keeps its piece of income cake un-395
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changed in the transition from market to disposable income. On the other hand, the share 
of the top quintile falls from 1/2 of pre-TB income to 1/3 of disposable income. Compa-
rison of “SSC and PIT” columns with “Pre-TB income” columns for each quintile group 
gives us impression that total taxes are mildly progressive. We therefore expect that more 
important wheel of redistribution will be public pensions.
3.3 Measures of redistributive effect
As Table 3 presents, the fiscal system defined by equations (1) to (4) achieves a re-
duction of income inequality of about 40%, as the Gini coefficient decreases from 0.5144 
to 0.2963 in the transition from pre-TB to post-TB income. The reranking introduced by 
the system is relatively high. A common interpretation of the reranking measure is the 
following: the redistributive effect would be 25% higher if reranking were eliminated. 
However, before making such a conclusion, the analyst must carefully consider the fiscal 
instruments involved. As will be seen later, most of the reranking is caused by pensions. 
In this case, elimination of reranking might call for considerable changes in the design of 
the pension and overall fiscal system.17 It will be shown later how much reranking is ca-
used by other instruments.
17 The issue of reranking is controversial and will receive more attention later during this project.
Figure 1 Composition of total income in 2005 by economic groups
Notes: Group averages expressed as percentages of “Fully employed” average disposable income. 
“Post-tax-pre-benefit income” is equal to xtmi+ntmi+nmng–pito.
Source: Author’s calculations based on APK
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Figure 2 Distribution of income, taxes and benefits in 2005, by quintile groups
Source: Author’s calculations based on APK
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3.4 Contributions of individual fiscal elements
Table 4 contains the information needed to decompose the redistributive effect into 
the contributions of individual fiscal elements. Before they are used in decomposition, it 397
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is instructive to look at the individual columns. Among taxes, PIT is the most progressive 
(Dx
Ti = 0.7710), while among benefits, basic support allowance is the most regressive (Dx
Bj 
= – 0.5422); this is expected because the two instruments are designed and calibrated with 
the purpose of income redistribution. “Pensions (65&>)” are very close in regressivity to 
basic support allowance (Dx
Bj = – 0.5045), but their amount is many times larger, and this 
makes “Pensions (65&>)” the most influential redistributive element (Vx
Bj =0.1260; while 
Vx
T for all taxes together is 0.0406). The other pension category, “Pensions (<65)” is only 
half as regressive (Dx
Bj  = –0.2607).
Columns 6 and 7 in Table 4 present the inequality of income (GX–Ti; GX+Bj ) and re-
distributive effect (REx
Ti  and REx
Bi) that would prevail if only the particular instrument was 
applied to the pre-TB income. Rerankings are also calculated for this case; the largest re-
ranking relative to REx
Ti (REx
Bi) of 38% is measured for “Pensions (<65)”, while for exam-
ple, for PIT it is less than 2%.
All calculations are now repeated for post-TB income as a reference base, and the re-
sults are shown in Table 5. To ask the main question again: which instruments are most 
important in achieving redistribution in Croatia? Tables 4 and 5 contain all the relevant 
data to compare the results for two approaches: the “decomposition” (Lambert, 1985) and 
“exclusion” (Immervoll et al, 2005) approaches, and for two reference bases: pre-TB in-
come and post-TB income. Redistributive effects of single instruments can be found in 
columns 7 and 12 of Tables 4 and 5 respectively, but for now we are more interested in 
the rankings shown in columns 8 and 13 of the same tables. These rankings are copied 
into the Table 6, and sorted in ascending order of the first column.
When pre-TB is the reference income “decomposition” and “exclusion” methods give 
almost identical results (columns 1 and 2 of Table 6). ‘Exclusion method & post-TB inco-
me’ (Table 6, column 4; this combination is used by Immervoll et al, 2005) ranks the first 
three instruments in the same way as the approaches in columns 1 and 2, while the five 
bottom-ranked instruments have the same order as in column 3. The most striking discre-
pancy appears between the ‘decomposition method & post-TB income’ (Table 6, column 
3) and all other models. “Pensions (<65)” are only ranked 5 here in contrast to rank 2 in 
all other models, while PIT with the rank 2, is just below the “Pensions (65&>)” which 
are unambiguously the prime redistributive instrument.
The difference between pre-TB and post-TB income as reference bases is also illu-
strated by Figure 3, which presents the results obtained by the “decomposition” method 
(column 12 of Tables 4 and 5). Pensions together capture over 80% of the redistributive 
effect if pre-TB income is chosen, but only 40% in the case of post-TB income. The con-
tribution of “Pensions (<65)” shrinks from 25% to 7%, while that of PIT rises from 5% 
Table 3 Inequality and redistributive effect
GX GN  Dx
N Dx
X  RE RE (% GX)V X RX RX (% RE)
0.5144 0.2963 0.2418 0.4389 0.2181 42 0.2726 0.0545 25
Source: author’s calculations based on APK398
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to 15% when the base is changed from pre- to post-TB income. While almost negligible 
when pre-TB is used, in post-TB income the combined SSCs become a major contributor 
to redistribution with 32% of the overall vertical effect.
This discrepancy in the results obtained for the “decomposition method” and the di-
fferent reference bases might be explained as follows.. When post-TB income is used as 
a reference base, reranking positively contributes to the redistributive effect (remember 
that). Now, observe in Table 5 (column 10) that “Pensions (<65)” achieve a remarkably 
high 67.7% of RE through reranking and only 32.3% through vertical effect. Since the 
“decomposition” approach considers only the vertical effect, it thus underestimates the 
contribution to the redistributive effect of instruments such as “Pensions (<65)”.
3.5 Comparison of results with other studies for Croatia
Two studies for Croatia mentioned in the introduction contradict the findings of this 
research. Both Nestić (2005) and Babić (2008) concluded that public pensions are inequ-
ality-increasing instrument, which is completely opposite to the result from section 3.4 
of this paper, which says that public pensions are the main inequality-decreasing instru-
ment. Where does this discrepancy come from? Which result is true?
The above-mentioned studies used the methodology given in Rao (1969), Kakwani 
(1977), and Fei, Ranis and Kuo (1978), which relates to the decomposition of the Gini 
coefficient, separating the influences of different income sources on disposable income 
Table 6 Contributions to redistributive effect, rankings obtained by different methods
Method Decomposition 
of vertical 
effect
Exclusion of 
one-by-one 
instrument 
from the base
Decomposition 
of vertical 
effect
Exclusion of 
one-by-one 
instrument from 
the base
Reference income Pre-TB Post-TB
  1   2   3   4
Pensions (65&>)   1   1   1   1
Pensions (<65)   2   2   5   2
PIT   3   3   2   3
Child allowance   4   4   3   4
Basic support allowance   5   6   6   6
SSC to the pension system   6   5   4   5
SSC to the health system   7   7   7   7
Unemployment benefit   8   8   8 8
Rehabilitation supplement   9   9 12 12
Maternity allowances 10 10 10 10
Sick-leave benefit 11 11 11 11
SSC to the unemployment 
protection system
12 12 9 9
Source: Author’s calculations based on APK401
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inequality. Thus, it decomposes income inequality, while the methodologies presented in 
section 2.4 decompose redistributive effect, or change in inequality of income that emer-
ges in the transition from pre-TB to post-TB income.
The differences in results deserve attention, and the topic may be further investiga-
ted during the next stage of this research. In this paper, we can announce two possible re-
asons for the contradictory results: 
a) The inequality decomposition approach (Rao, 1969, etc.) is very rigorous in dec-
laring benefits as “inequality-reducing”. Only if the concentration coefficient of benefit 
j is negative (Dn
Bj < 0), is this benefit said to be “inequality-reducing”. Otherwise (i.e. if 
Dn
Bj > 0), benefit j is claimed to be “inequality-increasing”. For the vertical effect decom-
position approach (Lambert, 1985), the condition to declare benefit j as “inequality-redu-
cing” is much less demanding: Dn
Bj < GN.
The situation is opposite for taxes. For the inequality decomposition approach it only 
has to be Dn
Ti > 0 and tax i will be called “inequality-reducing”. For the vertical effect de-
composition approach the condition is much more demanding: Dn
Ti > GN.
b) The two studies do not include taxes in the analysis. Thus, for example, in the 
examination of pension system, only one-half of it is covered – the pensions, but not the 
contributions. According to research by Čok and Urban (2007), it seems that the inclu-
sion of taxes into the above mentioned inequality decomposition analyses could change 
the conclusions in favor of the “inequality-reduction” stance of some fiscal subsystems 
in Croatia.18
18 This research applied inequality decomposition in the estimation of the redistributive effect of PIT in Croatia 
and Slovenia. It was based on administrative data. Pensions in Croatia in 2001 contributed plus 8.3%, to disposable 
income inequality with while PIT contributed minus 21.4%.
Figure 3 Contributions to vertical effect obtained by decomposition
Source: Author’s calculations based on APK
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4 Conclusion
Research on fiscal incidence and redistributive effects in Croatia started from the cho-
ice of appropriate framework for analysis. Following many other researchers, the author 
decided to measure the incidence of the fiscal subsystem consisting of individual taxes 
(SSC and PIT), public pensions, means-tested and non-means tested cash benefits. The 
unit of analysis is the household, whose incomes, taxes and benefits are equivalized in 
order to adjust for differences in needs. Transition from pre- to post-tax-and-benefit in-
come is carefully dissected and analyzed to reveal which instruments contribute most to 
the reduction of inequality. According to preliminary calculations from 2005 APK data, 
the Croatian system of individual taxes, pensions and social benefits seems to be highly 
redistributive, public pensions being the instrument contributing the most, followed by 
SSC and PIT.
It was also shown that the choice of reference income – between pre-TB and post-TB 
income – may lead to considerably different conclusions about contributions of individual 
fiscal instruments to overall redistributive effect. An exercise with Croatian data shows that 
when the reference base is changed from pre-TB to post-TB income in the context of the 
vertical effect decomposition defined by Lambert (1985), the contribution of public pen-
sions falls from 80% to 40%, while the contribution of individual taxes rises from 11% to 
47%. However, further research is required to understand these discrepancies. 
This paper has not dealt with policy issues and recommendations, but these will be 
covered in the final stage of the research project. Nevertheless, a number of questions 
can already be raised to which this research will be able either to find answers or to con-
tribute to the finding of them. Let us mention some of them. How does the Croatian fis-
cal system stand comparison with that of EU countries in terms of income redistributi-
on? Are the individual instruments and the system as a whole redistributive enough? Are 
there some instruments that are not equitable? Should taxes be more progressive? Can 
the overall redistributive effect be significantly altered through changes of the PIT rate 
schedule? How can total welfare be increased keeping the total amount of expenditures 
and taxes unchanged?
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